DOGMATISM WITHOUT MOOREANISM

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ABSTRACT

One common way of attacking dogmatism is to attack its alleged Mooreanism. The thought is that dogmatism includes (or perhaps entails) Mooreanism, but that Mooreanism is false and thus so is dogmatism. One way of responding to this charge is to defend Mooreanism. Another strategy is to articulate a version of dogmatism without Mooreanism. This paper is an attempt to articulate the latter view.

1. Setting Things Up

One way of attacking dogmatism is to attack its alleged Mooreanism. The thought is that dogmatism includes Mooreanism, but that Mooreanism is false and thus so is dogmatism. One way of responding to this charge is to defend Mooreanism. Another strategy, the one I shall employ here, is to articulate a version of dogmatism without Mooreanism. I argue that dogmatism need not include Mooreanism. Before doing so, I will need to explain dogmatism and Mooreanism. I do this in the remainder of section 1. In section 2, I explain the standardly conceived relation between dogmatism and Mooreanism and why dogmatism's critics reject Mooreanism and hence, dogmatism. Finally, in section 3, I articulate a non-Moorean version of dogmatism.

Dogmatism[1] is articulated in slightly different ways by its proponents, yielding several dogmatisms.[2] I shall be thinking of the view thusly:

Dogmatism: (i) A seeming that p is, all by itself, a warrant for p, and (ii) a belief that p is doxastically justified for a cognizer S iff S's belief that p is based on (appropriately connected to) its seeming to S that p.[3]

A warrant for p is a propositional justifier of p and is something that provides propositional justification for p.[4] (i) is therefore about propositional justification, which is what dogmatism has traditionally been understood to be: a view about propositional rather than doxastic justification. (ii) is about doxastic justification and says that a belief must be based on its warrant in order to be doxastically justified.

Mooreanism, as I am thinking of it here, is the view that the following argument does not suffer from transmission failure:

Moore's Argument

E: It perceptually seems to me that I have hands.

H: I have hands.

W: I do not have fake-hands.

This presentation of Moore's argument comes from White (2006, p. 528)[5] rather than from Moore himself.[6] In following White's presentation of the argument and calling that Moore's Argument, I am adapting Moore's actual argument to suit the interests of dogmatists and their critics.[7]

An argument suffers from transmission failure just in case the premises of an argument fail to transmit justification to its conclusion.

If we're talking about propositional justification, then in a case of transmission failure, the premises, though themselves warranted, perhaps, fail to give warrant to the conclusion. In a case like this, the premises possess warrant, but fail to transmit warrant to the conclusion. If we're talking about doxastic justification, then in a case of transmission failure, one's inference to the conclusion fails to transmit doxastic justification. In a case like this, one may well have doxastically justified belief in the premises, deduce the conclusion from the premises, and yet lack doxastically justified belief in the conclusion. In cases of successful transmission, one's belief in the conclusion is justified due to one's belief in the premises being justified and to that justification being transmitted to one's belief in the conclusion via a competent deduction of the conclusion from the premises. In a case of successful transmission, one justifiably believes that *q* *because* one justifiably believes both *p* and that *p* entails *q*, and one competently deduces *q* from *p* and believes *q* on the basis of that deduction.[8]

There are quotidian cases of transmission failure, such as when the premises lack justification to begin with, or when the premises fail to adequately support the conclusion. The interesting question is when competent deductions fail to transmit justification from premises to conclusion. Following (roughly) Tucker (2010a, p. 517), we can say that when *S* competently deduces *q* from *p*, *S* justifiably believes *p*, *p* really does support *q* and *S* is aware of this, *S* lacks defeaters, and *S* infers *q* from *p* and believes that *q* on the basis of that inference. One quite controversial question is whether Moore's Argument is a case of transmission failure. Mooreanism says that it isn't, that *E* and *H* can transmit their justification—propositional and doxastic—to *W*.

How is this idea of transmission, one might wonder, related to the more familiar idea of closure? A closure principle about an epistemic property φ says that φ is closed under known entailment. For example, a closure principle about knowledge is that if *S* knows that *p* and also knows that *p* entails *q*, then *S* knows that *q*. A closure principle about warrant would say that if *S* has warrant (propositional justification) for *p* and for *p* entailing *q*, then *S* has warrant for *q*. Transmission principles are stronger than their closure cousins because transmission principles specify the reason *why* the conclusion has the epistemic property in question. For example, the transmission correlate of the closure principle articulated two sentences ago would be that *S* has warrant for *q* *because* *S* has warrant for *p* and *S* has warrant for *p* entailing *q*. Closure principles are of this form: if *X and Y obtain, then Z obtains* while transmission principles are of the form *if X and Y obtain, then Z obtains in virtue of X and Y obtaining*. A closure principle won't say why *Z* obtains, only that, given that *X* and *Y* obtain, *Z* also obtains. A transmission principle tells us that *Z*'s obtaining when *X* and *Y* obtain is due to there being some important connection between *X* and *Y* and *Z*.[9]

Before moving on to explain the standardly assumed connection between dogmatism and Mooreanism, and then from there to explain how one can be a dogmatist without being a Moorean, I should like to briefly point out that one can also be a Moorean without being a dogmatist. A Moorean can affirm that competently deducing *W* from one's justified belief in *E* and *H* results in a justified belief in *W* without also holding on to a seemings-based account of propositional and doxastic justification. Mooreans are free to embrace any one of a number of views about justification just as—I will show—dogmatists are free to embrace any one of a number of views about skepticism.

2. Dogmatism with Mooreanism

It is standardly assumed that dogmatism includes or entails Mooreanism, that any good dogmatist will or even must also be

a Moorean. This standard assumption is reinforced by the fact that dogmatism's advocates frequently defend Mooreanism.[10] It is not hard to see why a dogmatist might think she must or should also be a Moorean. Suppose I have a seemings-based justified belief in E, from which I acquire, through a non-deviant causal chain, a seemings-based justified belief in H, which I notice is confirmed by E; suppose that I then notice that W follows from H, and that it does indeed seem to me that W is true, and that I therefore go on to believe W on the basis of competent deduction from H—doesn't my competently deduced, seemings-based belief in W satisfy all the relevant dogmatist desiderata? How could the dogmatist deny that my belief in W is justified? This supposed connection between dogmatism and Mooreanism suggests a simple strategy for refuting dogmatism: show that Mooreanism is false. In the remainder of this section, I will discuss two examples of this strategy in the literature. A dogmatist could respond to those who employ this strategy by defending Mooreanism. In section 3, eschewing this strategy, I articulate a version of dogmatism *without* Mooreanism.

White (2006) rejects dogmatism by rejecting Mooreanism. He charges the dogmatist with embracing Moore's Argument as a way of responding to skepticism. On White's reading, the dogmatist affirms the acceptability of reasoning from E to H and then from E and H to W. White faults the dogmatist's Mooreanism on the grounds that the dogmatist relies on an obviously false principle about confirmation: that whenever p confirms q, p also confirms all of q's entailments.[11] Relying on this principle, the dogmatist moves from E and H to W. More perspicuously, the dogmatist believes H on E and then W on E. If we read the situation the way White does, it is not hard to see why we might be tempted to think that a dogmatist must also be a Moorean. Assume for a moment what White charges the dogmatist with assuming—that E

confirms H and thereby also confirms what H entails, namely W. From the dogmatist perspective, we need now only ask whether (some cognizer) S, assumed to be in possession of warrant for E, thereby also has warrant for W; well, if it seems to S that E, and if S then notices the connections between E, H, and W, and it thereby seems to S that W, it looks like a dogmatist is going to have to say that S has warrant for W. The problem is that, given the falsity of the principle about confirmation, E does not transmit any of its propositional justification (warrant) to W. White argues that while E does confirm H, it also confirms $\sim W$, and thus E doesn't give one a reason to believe W.

Although my chief objective here is not to defend Moore's Argument against the charge of transmission failure, I should at least like to point out one thing about White's critique of dogmatism, which is that White misrepresents what the dogmatist is up to when she articulates Moore's Argument. The dogmatist need not be understood as affirming a successful transmission of justification (propositional or doxastic) from E to both H *and* W on the grounds that whenever p confirms q, it also confirms all of q's entailments. Huemer (2000, p. 402), in fact, explicitly rejects the false principle of confirmation—that whenever p confirms q, it confirms all of q's entailments—that White attributes to dogmatists. The dogmatist is instead affirming that H justifies W. In other words, the dogmatist is not saying that E justifies both H *and* W, given that W is a consequence of H. Rather, the idea is that E justifies H and that H, in turn, justifies W. This move doesn't depend on the obviously false principle of confirmation that White attributes to dogmatism. Silins (2005, pp. 87–88), Tucker (2010a, pp. 506–507), and Pryor (2013, p. 109) all point out that the Moorean is moving from H to W rather than from E to W.[12]

The second example comes from Cohen (2002). Cohen objects to dogmatism[13] on the

grounds that it allows for easy knowledge, that it too easily allows us to gain knowledge of the reliability of our cognitive faculties. This allowance stems from the dogmatist's endorsement of basic knowledge, or "knowledge prior to one's knowing that the source is reliable" (p. 310). Starting with such basic knowledge one can, assuming closure,[14] reason one's way to the proposition that one is not, say, a brain-in-a-vat (BIV). In Cohen's favorite example, he asks us to imagine believing that the table is red because it looks red, and then inferring that the table is not white and illuminated by red lights. Cohen is very careful to point out that there is no problem in saying that if S knows the table is red, then S knows that the table is not white but illuminated by red lights. The problem, he says, is the *way* in which the Moorean thinks this latter proposition is known. Applying Cohen to Moore's Argument, we get closure affirmation plus transmission denial. In other words, Cohen is denying that S can justifiably[15] infer W from E and H. He is denying that E and H transmit justification (knowledge) to W. He is *not* denying that if S has justification (knowledge) for E and H, then S has justification (knowledge) for W. And, ultimately, he is making trouble for dogmatism by pointing out that dogmatism's affirmation of Moore-style reasoning is problematic.

3. Dogmatism without Mooreanism

I won't defend Moorean dogmatism (nor will I criticize it). Rather, I'm interested in articulating a non-Moorean dogmatism. I take myself to be helping the dogmatist by showing that the falsity of Mooreanism wouldn't entail the falsity of dogmatism. In the remainder of this section, I explain two ways in which one can have such a dogmatism.

The Moorean dogmatist says that closure holds because transmission holds. That is, the Moorean dogmatist says that if S has warrant for E and H, and also for *E and H entail W*,

then S has warrant for W. That is her affirmation of closure. But she goes further and says that the *reason why S has warrant for W* is that S has warrant for E and H and for *E and H entail W*—that her warrant for these three things is what makes it the case that S has warrant for W. She says that S's warrant for E, H, and *E and H entail W* is transmitted to W and that this is why the closure principle holds.[16]

The first way in which dogmatists can deny Mooreanism is to deny closure about warrant.[17] Dogmatists and their critics (often) assume that dogmatism includes an affirmation of closure and then an affirmation of transmission success as an explanation for why closure holds. But the dogmatist doesn't have to affirm closure, and if she didn't, there'd be no reason to push for transmission success. If you look at (i) and (ii) of dogmatism, you'll see that there's nothing there about closure affirmation. The dogmatist is free to say that E justifies H but that H doesn't justify W. The dogmatist can also say that E justifies H without also justifying W, even though H entails W. The dogmatist is free to deny that S has warrant for H only if S has warrant for W. Likewise (i.e., in the case of doxastic justification), the dogmatist is free to deny that S's belief in H is justified only if S's belief in W is justified. Essentially, the dogmatist is free to deny that a seeming that p provides warrant for p only if that seeming or p itself transmits warrant to q, an entailment of p's. None of these denials is inconsistent with either (i) or (ii) of dogmatism.

Denying closure is going to make for a lot of unhappiness in some quarters, but to soften the blow, let us note that the dogmatist needn't say that closure never holds. It might be that closure holds in some cases but not in others. That is, it might be that there are special reasons why closure doesn't hold in certain cases. And the dogmatist might say that Moore's Argument is one such case. She might say that, in this case, she is confident

that *E* and *H* are true and that the truth of *E* is sufficient for her possessing warrant for *H*, but that this doesn't entail that she has warrant for *W*. Such a dogmatist could say that unless her evidence for *W* discriminates between it and ~*W*, she doesn't have warrant for *W*. This dogmatist, again, won't necessarily say that closure never holds. For example, she might say that if *S* has warrant for *1 is a prime number* and *the number 1 is not identical to the number 2*, then *S* has warrant for *1 is an odd number*. The basic point, then, is that dogmatists are free to say that we can sometimes but not always extend our knowledge by deduction.

What is going on here is that we are making a distinction between dogmatism proper and the typical dogmatist's response to radical skepticism. Dogmatism proper is a view about justification, not a response to skepticism. There is no irrevocable connection between dogmatism proper and Mooreanism. You can be a dogmatist without being a Moorean, and you can be a Moorean without being a dogmatist. Dogmatism does deny that a seeming that *p* provides warrant for *p* only if one has independent justification for rejecting some alternative proposition *q*.[18] It should be obvious, however, that affirming this does not commit one to closure and transmission. A dogmatist can coherently say that a seeming that *p* doesn't need help to justify the proposition that *p and* that the warrant this seeming gives to *p* does not transfer to all of *p*'s entailments (*and that being doxastically justified* does not transfer from belief in *p* to belief in any old consequence of *p*). A dogmatist can coherently say "it's seeming to *S* that *p* justifies *p* for *S*" and "it's false that this entails that *S* has justification for believing all of *p*'s consequences."

Of course, the non-Moorean dogmatist need not succumb to skepticism. She can, if she wants, avail herself of any number of anti-skeptical arguments.[19] In reality, however, the non-Moorean dogmatist has her own

ready-to-hand response to skepticism: if it seems to you that, say, the BIV hypothesis is false, then you are justified in taking it to be false. If the BIV hypothesis seems false to you, then you have warrant for rejecting it, and if you reject it on the basis of that seeming, then your rejection is doxastically justified. Such a dogmatist needn't claim that such a rejection is based on an inference from *E* and *H* to *W*. Such a dogmatist may, rejecting Mooreanism, realize that such an inference would fail to transmit justification to *W*. Nevertheless, she might still consider *W* and find herself with the seeming that *W* is true and the BIV hypothesis isn't. The dogmatist needn't say that a cognizer *S* must be able to explain just exactly what is wrong with the BIV hypothesis in order to have warrant for rejecting it on the basis of its seeming to *S* that it is false. Analogously, it may seem to *S* that making a promise to φ gives one a reason to φ. *S* may, on the basis of this seeming, have warrant for believing this principle about promising even though *S* lacks a worked-out moral theory in which this principle is neatly explained.

This will probably seem like an odd sort of dogmatist epistemology, but I think we can motivate it by considering analogues. First, consider someone who says that belief in God can be noninferentially justified on the basis of religious experience. The proposition that God exists does, of course, entail the proposition that the problem of evil does not show that theism is false. But we can easily imagine a religious epistemologist who denies closure in this case and says that one's possession of warrant (propositional justification) for *God exists* does not entail that one also possesses warrant sufficient for the rejection of *The problem of evil shows that theism is false*. Second, consider someone who says that I can have warrant for believing *It's wrong to break promises for trivial reasons* without also having warrant for *Mackie's argument from queerness against moral realism fails* even though the former entails the latter.

Finally, consider someone who says that *p* has justification for *S* only if the probability calculus says that the probability of *p* reaches a certain level—the justification level, let's say. Suppose *r* raises *p* to the justification level while also lowering *q*, a consequence of *p*, below it. This probabilist therefore believes *p* while suspending judgment on *q*. I'm not saying we should make any of these moves, nor that we should embrace anti-Moorean dogmatism, but the plausibility of these moves does, I think, help to bolster the plausibility of anti-Moorean dogmatism.[20]

The second way of getting dogmatism without Mooreanism is to affirm that Moore's Argument transmits warrant but not doxastic justification. The most natural way to do this is to reduce dogmatism to dogmatism-(i), to affirm only the first plank of dogmatism. Dogmatism-(i) is actually more in line with dogmatism as it is typically formulated by the likes of Pryor, Huemer, and Tucker. These dogmatists, for the most part, advocate dogmatism as a view about propositional justification, or warrant. (ii) is a natural extension of dogmatism-(i), but one is free to affirm (i) without (ii). One might want to affirm dogmatism-(i) by itself because one has well-formed views about propositional justification but not about doxastic justification. One might even have quite different views about propositional and doxastic justification. One might think, for example, that seemings provide propositional justification but that one's beliefs aren't doxastically justified unless they are reliably formed.

This second way preserves a kind of Mooreanism in that it is Moorean about warrant: it says that Moore's Argument transmits warrant, just not doxastic justification. The second way preserves the idea that an agent who believes *E* and *H* has evidence for *W*. That is good, for this is a very plausible idea. However, it denies that an agent can get doxastically justified belief that *W* by inferring it from *E* and *H*. That also is at least plausible,

for the sort of reason that Cohen gives. Thus the second way gives something to both sides. It preserves the thought that *E* and *H* are at least evidence for *W* as well as the thought that there is something terribly wrong with Moore's Argument.

Perhaps an example will help to bolster the plausibility of this move. Imagine Neo in thr movie *The Matrix* prior to Morpheus's revelation that all is not as it seems. Suppose we tweak the story by adding that the machines have chopped off the hands of almost all its human victims, but that Neo is one of those rare humans who still has his hands. Now, at this stage of the game, Neo has plenty of warrant or propositional justification for *H*. Our epistemologist—the Oracle, we'll call her—who embraces dogmatism-(i), concurs. However, she adds, Neo's belief in *H*, though true, lacks doxastic justification because it was not formed in a truth-conducive way. Doxastic justification, the Oracle reminds us, is supposed to get us very close to knowledge, and Neo's belief in *H* is, though true, nowhere close to knowledge. Neo, she might add, is not being irrational in believing *H*, but justification and rationality are two different things.[21]

The Oracle can say this about Moore's Argument:

> Neo could not use Moore's Argument to get doxastically justified belief in *W*. Neo does have warrant for *E* and *H*, and together these do transmit warrant to *W*. Nevertheless, there is more to doxastic justification than the possession of warrant. To have doxastic justification, one's belief must be truth-conducively formed. And Neo's belief in *W*, and in *H*, would not be doxastically justified. Basing one's belief on the evidence is not enough to get *doxastic* justification. That evidence (evidence of that type) must also reliably get you to the truth. So, while Moore's Argument does transmit warrant, it fails to transmit doxastic justification.

The Oracle is a good example of how someone could affirm dogmatism-(i) whilst rejecting Mooreanism.

The Oracle resembles someone who embraces Comesaña's (2010) evidentialist reliabilism. On this view, doxastic justification for a belief that p requires possessing evidence e, basing one's belief that p on that evidence, and de facto reliability for the process-type *producing belief that p based on e*. Someone could embrace this view of doxastic justification whilst possessing the dogmatist view of propositional justification. A similar view can be generated by modifying Brogaard's (2013) sensible dogmatism. On this view, only seemings that are grounded can give propositional justification, where a seeming that p is grounded in the content c of an experience e for a cognizer S iff it is reliably the case that (i) if c is the content of e, then it seems to S as if p and it is reliably the case that (ii) if it seems to S that p, then p (p. 277). We can turn this into a view about doxastic justification—sensible dogmatism*—by saying that a belief that is based on a seeming is doxastically justified only if that seeming is grounded.

The options just canvassed appear to be internalist-externalist hybrids. Here is a purely internalist option: a belief possesses doxastic justification only if one has reliability evidence that the source that produced the belief is reliable. This view is inspired by Steup's (2004) internalist reliabilism, but modified so as to be about doxastic rather than propositional justification.[22] Here is the view, and let's call it "reliabilist dogmatism":

> Reliabilist Dogmatism: (i) A seeming that p is, all by itself, a warrant for p, and (ii) a belief that p is doxastically justified for a cognizer S iff (a) S's belief that p is based on (appropriately connected to) its seeming to S that p and (b) S has evidence that the faculty producing the seeming that p is reliable.[23]

On reliabilist dogmatism, Moore's Argument will successfully transmit warrant but not doxastic justification. The reason, of course, is that S's belief in H will lack doxastic justification and so will be unable to transmit it to S's belief in W. If S does have the reliability evidence in question, then she can run the following argument:

> R: I've got E-independent evidence in favor of the reliability of my perceptual faculties (i.e., in favor of W).
>
> E: It perceptually seems to me that I have hands.
>
> H: I have hands.
>
> W: I do not have fake-hands.

A proponent of reliabilist dogmatism can say that *this* argument transmits doxastic justification whilst Moore's Argument does not. On reliabilist dogmatism, justificatory juice flows freely from seemings to their propositions (their propositional contents), but not so freely from seemings to *belief* in those propositions. There, one more condition is needed: reliability evidence. Propositional justification comes in spades: anytime you've got a seeming, you've got warrant. Doxastic justification is trickier business, however; there, the target is not an isolated proposition, but belief in that proposition. Doxastic justification has an extra ingredient: reliability evidence. Finally, notice also that the proponent of dogmatism can affirm a plausible closure principle about *propositional* justification: if S has warrant for E and H and also has warrant for H *entails* W, then S has warrant for W.

In articulating such epistemologies, we are taking advantage of a little-noticed feature of dogmatism-(i): it provides only a sufficiency condition for propositional justification. Dogmatism-(i) says something fairly minimal (though not without philosophical significance): here is one way to get propositional justification—seemings (seemings are warrants). To say that seemings are sufficient for warrant or propositional justification doesn't imply much at all in the way of doxastic justification. And notice, finally, that the Oracle—and the evidentialist reliabilist, sensible dogmatist*, and reliabilist dogmatist—need not deny closure altogether, that there is a plausible closure principle she can

still affirm. She can say that the following closure principle holds: if *S* has warrant for *E* and *H* and also has warrant for H *entails* W, then *S* has warrant for *W*.

4. Answering Objections

Now it may seem that this entire project, of arguing that dogmatists needn't be Mooreans, can be successfully carried out by arguing that dogmatism is incompatible with inferential justification in general, and thus with the Moorean's insistence that we can get an inferentially justified belief in *W* by competent deduction from justified beliefs in *E* and *H*.[24] For given dogmatism's clause (ii), which requires, for doxastic justification, that a belief be based on a seeming state, isn't it the case that the dogmatist turns all justification into immediate or non-inferential justification? We normally distinguish between such bases of belief as memory, testimony, perceptual experience, intellectual seeming, inference, and so on. But in requiring seemings for all justified beliefs, the dogmatist appears to be denying that one can get a justified belief by basing that belief on another justified belief; the dogmatist, in other words, requires a seemingly non-inferential basis for every justified belief, and thus seems to be denying the possibility of inferential justification. And if this is so, then Mooreanism is ruled out rather easily as the Moorean affirms the possibility of an inferentially justified belief in *W*. This argument, if correct, would seriously undermine the credibility of dogmatism by putting it into conflict with the obvious truth that inferential justification is both possible and actual. It would make the compatibility of dogmatism and non-Mooreanism trivial by turning dogmatism into a view almost no one would be willing to hold, let alone defend.

Fortunately, the notion that dogmatism is incompatible with inferential justification is incorrect. Tucker (2010b) and Bergmann (2013) suggest that non-inferentially justified beliefs are based on seemings (some of)

which are in turn based on experiences. For example, I might have a perceptual experience, which causes a seeming that *p*, which produces belief that *p*. This chain suggests the possibility that something analogous is at work in the case of inferentially formed and inferentially justified belief. Perhaps, in the case of inference, there are analogous relationships between the believed premise, the inferred conclusion, and the seeming that the former supports the latter. Huemer (2016) has spelled this out by arguing that when we form an inferentially justified belief that *q* on the basis of believed premise *p*, this is caused by or happens via the seeming (what Huemer calls an "intellectual appearance") that *p* supports *q*. The idea is that to justifiably infer *q* from *p*, it must seem to one that *p* supports *q*, and this seeming must be the reason why *q* is inferred from *p*. So, if one properly infers *q* from one's justified belief that *p* because it seems to one that *p* supports *q*, then it seems reasonable to hold that this is a case of an inferentially formed and inferentially justified belief that is also based on a seeming, and which would therefore satisfy clause (ii) of dogmatism. There are non-inferential seemings, such as the memorial seeming that I had oatmeal for breakfast, and inferential seemings, such as that *(p & q) supports p*; thus it is a mistake to think that a seemings-based belief can't also be inferentially held. So, dogmatism is not incompatible with inferential justification, and thus the dogmatist can't dismiss Mooreanism on such grounds. This is a welcome result for the dogmatist, who most assuredly does not want to have to choose between dogmatism and the idea that inferential justification is possible (and actual). More could and should be said about all of this, no doubt, but this isn't the place to do that.

Another objection, perhaps more pressing than the last, is that the options canvassed in the previous section—evidentialist reliabilism plus dogmatism-(i), sensible dogmatism*,

and reliabilist dogmatism—so bifurcate propositional and doxastic justification that they undermine our grasp of the very distinction they exploit.[25] After all, it is common to elucidate the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification by saying that doxastic justification requires that one base one's belief on the ground, reason, justification, or evidence that is one's propositional justification. This basing requirement is what the distinction boils down to; hence, by requiring more than basing, wouldn't these accounts put too much distance between propositional and doxastic justification?

In my view, this potential problem isn't too worrisome. Propositional justification is a property of a proposition, a relation that holds between a proposition and a cognizer. Doxastic justification is a property of a belief, of a mental state. They are two different properties of two different things; it should not be surprising if they have different instantiation conditions. There is nothing inherently implausible or problematic with the idea that doxastic justification might require more than basing one's belief on the evidence. I don't see how any account of doxastic justification that goes beyond this *thereby* undermines our grasp on the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification.

Those who balk at this cleavage between propositional and doxastic justification no doubt subscribe to Turri's (2010, p. 314) Basis principle:

> (Basis) IF (i) p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of S having reason(s) R, and (ii) S believes p on the basis of R, THEN S's belief that p is doxastically justified.

Basis is implied by full-blown dogmatism, but not by dogmatism-(i). Turri shows that many epistemologists are committed to Basis, a result that won't be surprising to anyone reading this paper. Turri also shows, however, that Basis is false by appealing to cases in which an agent bases her belief on

her reason in an inappropriate way, cases in which it seems clear that the agent lacks a justified belief. For example, if I believe that $(p \cdot q \cdot r)$, and this conjunction makes s "overwhelmingly likely" (as Turri puts it), and I then believe s on the basis of $(p \cdot q \cdot r)$, I won't necessarily have a justified belief. If I arrive at s by applying a false inference rule, for example, my belief that s will be inappropriately based on my good reason (warrant, propositional justification) for s. The moral of the story is that doxastic justification requires more than having a warrant and basing one's belief on that warrant.

This is not an outcome that will be shocking to anyone with externalist sympathies. Externalists commonly require more than having a warrant and basing one's belief on that warrant for doxastic justification. Externalists typically think that a belief isn't justified unless it was formed in a truth-conducive way, that doxastic justification is a truth-conducive property (of a belief). This thought is the motive behind some externalists' claim that demon victims don't have justified perceptual beliefs after all. Senor (2013), for example, argues that the concept of justification plays a theoretical role in epistemological theorizing and that the correct way to identify what is required for a belief to count as (doxastically) justified is to figure out the theoretical role played by justification. For Senor, justification is that which normally turns beliefs into knowledge, a status lacked by demon victims' perceptual beliefs, as those beliefs are false in the demon victims' actual world and all nearby worlds.[26] My point is not that Senor's view is correct, but rather that the bifurcation between propositional and doxastic justification is not a novel or radical idea. Reliabilists like Comesaña want to add to doxastic justification a de facto reliability requirement. Proper functionalists like Bergmann (2006) want to add to doxastic justification a proper function requirement. These accounts may, at the end of the day, be false, but they are

not outlandish, at least not for the reason that they reject Basis and require more than basing for doxastic justification. Thus my twists on sensible dogmatism and internalist reliabilism—sensible dogmatism* and reliabilist dogmatism—are not to be discounted merely because they place different requirements on propositional and doxastic justification.

One possible rejoinder here is that we've simply been given no good reason to think that these extra-basing requirements on doxastic justification really *do* belong on warrant or propositional justification. Isn't that where Brogaard and Steup had them originally? And why should we move them? Aren't they more naturally understood as conditions on warrant rather than on doxastic justification? Dogmatists certainly wouldn't think so, or at least those who subscribe just to dogmatism-(i). They give pro-dogmatist arguments for thinking that dogmatism-(i) captures the truth about propositional justification. If you are impressed by these arguments, but also by the thought that doxastic justification is harder to come by, you've got the ingredients for the kind of theory I've been discussing. Suppose, for example, that you embrace a view widely accepted in Bayesian circles: the positive relevance criterion of evidence, which says that some datum D is evidence for a hypothesis H iff D is more likely on H than on $\sim H$. Now suppose you are further persuaded, by dogmatists, that seemings can be evidence and that a seeming that H gives one evidence (warrant, propositional justification) for H because that seeming is more likely on H than $\sim H$. Someone with a view like this could

also think that *doxastic justification* requires more than simply basing one's belief that H on one's seeming that H; someone might be persuaded by Turri or the externalists that doxastic justification doesn't come as easily as warrant and thus might well require more than basing. You could, for example, embrace the positive relevance criterion of evidence as well as dogmatism-(i), but accept proper functionalism about doxastic justification. On such a view, one might argue, a belief that is based on a seeming isn't doxastically justified unless the seeming is produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties. Maybe the reader will have little trouble dismissing such a view, but surely it can't be dismissed *just because* it goes beyond the requirement of basing one's belief on the evidence.

5. CONCLUSION

We have seen, then, that one should not object to dogmatism by objecting to Mooreanism. The dogmatist has plenty of non-Moorean options. The dogmatist can reject closure and thereby reject Moore's Argument. Or the dogmatist can reduce her view to dogmatism-(i), to a view about propositional justification, and develop a non-dogmatist theory of doxastic justification. For all that, of course, dogmatists are free to be Mooreans and free to defend Mooreanism. In doing so, however, they should understand that their dogmatism doesn't mandate Mooreanism. One can be a dogmatist without being a Moorean, and a Moorean without being a dogmatist.

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NOTES

1. In this paper, I use "dogmatism" rather than the more cumbersome "phenomenal conservatism."

2. See the varying definitions given by Pryor (2000); Huemer (2007); Tucker (2010b); and Lycan (2013).

3. This conception of dogmatism closely follows and is intentionally modeled on Tucker's "When Transmission Fails" (2010a, p. 523). In a footnote to his definition of dogmatism, Tucker notes that he and Pryor both defend (i) (cf. Pryor 2000 and Tucker 2010b) and that he accepts both (i) and (ii). We could make (ii) weaker by revising it thusly: "A blf that p is doxastically justified for a cognizer S only if S's belief that p is based on it seeming to S that p." Another weaker alternative would be: "If S's belief that p is based on its seeming to S that p, then S's belief that p is (*prima facie*) doxastically justified."

4. In thinking of warrant as a propositional justifier, I follow Tucker (2010a) and his conversation partners. This is quite different from the way in which Plantinga (1993) thinks of warrant, which for him is that which turns true belief into knowledge, is possessed by a belief only when that belief is produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties, and so on.

5. I should note that White does not himself refer to this argument as Moore's Argument.

6. Here is Moore's (1962, p. 144) actual argument:

    E*: Here are two hands.

    H*: If hands exist, then there is an external world.

    W*: So there is an external world.

This is the exact argument with which Pryor (2004) opens his "What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?"

7. Wright (2008, p. 26) says that a *neo*-Moorean is one who rebuts or "importantly qualifies" negative criticisms of Moore's Argument. For the sake of convenience, I shall drop the "neo" as a qualifier and talk of a Moorean as one who says that Moore's Argument does not suffer from transmission failure.

8. Compare Silins (2005, p. 74).

9. For an overview of transmission, see Tucker (2014).

10. See, for example, Huemer (2000); Pryor (2000, 2004); Lycan (2001); and Tucker (2010a).

11. See pp. 532–537 of White's (2006) for his discussion of why this principle about confirmation is wrong. As it turns out, sometimes p can confirm q and a proposition that is incompatible with q. In this case, it so happens that E confirms $\sim W$, and this because $P(E/\sim W) > P(E)$, which, of course, entails that the $P(\sim W/E) > P(\sim W)$.

12. White seems to be confusing two things that, as Tucker (2010a, p. 506n10) points out, need to be kept distinct: the transmission of the propositional justifier and the transmission of propositional justification. In our case here, E is the propositional justifier, that is, the warrant. To say that H transmits propositional justification to W is not to say that W is justified by the very thing that justifies H—that is, E.

13. Cohen calls dogmatism "evidentialist foundationalism."

14. Here is the closure principle Cohen is working with: "If S knows P and S knows P entails Q, then S knows (or at least is in a position to know) Q" (2002, p. 312).

15. Cohen talks about knowledge rather than justification, but I take it that S cannot know that the table is not white but illuminated by red lights on the basis of the table looking red because S cannot justifiably believe this on that basis.

16. The Moorean dogmatist says the same thing about doxastic justification. Doxastic justification is closed under known entailment: if S justifiably believes E and H, then S also justifiably believes W (as-

suming *S* believes *W* on the basis of a competent deduction). And the reason (the Moorean dogmatist adds) for this is that the epistemic property *being doxastically justified* is transmitted from *S*'s belief in *E* and *H* to *S*'s belief in *W*.

17. Denying closure isn't very popular, but it happens. For a recent argument against closure, see Dretske (2005).

18. According to Tucker (2010a, p. 523), for example, "dogmatism . . . allows a perceptual experience to justify a belief without the help of antecedent warrant that one is not a brain-in-a-vat."

19. She is free, for instance, to follow Descartes's lead: establish the existence of God and then infer from theism that one does not suffer from radical deception. She is free to follow Vogel (1990) and argue that the real-world hypothesis is a better explanation of our experiences than the BIV hypothesis.

20. For an application of dogmatism to religious epistemology, see Tucker (2011). And for an application of dogmatism to moral epistemology, see Huemer (2005).

21. If you don't understand the example, your homework is to go and watch (or re-watch) the Matrix movies.

22. This way of talking, of "reliability evidence," comes from Matthias Steup. Steup's (2004, p. 418) view, internalist reliabilism, says that "I can have justification for my perceptual beliefs only if first I am in possession of evidence for believing that my perceptual faculties are reliable."

23. For a less stringent version, we can weaken (ii) thusly: "A belief that *p* is doxastically justified for a cognizer *S* only if (a) *S*'s belief that *p* is based on (appropriately connected to) its seeming to *S* that *p* and (b) *S* has evidence that the faculty producing the seeming that *p* is reliable." Here is another weaker alternative: "If (a) *S*'s belief that *p* is based on (appropriately connected to) its seeming to *S* that *p* and (b) *S* has evidence that the faculty producing the seeming that *p* is reliable, then *S*'s belief that *p* is doxastically justified."

24. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this objection.

25. Thanks to Mike Huemer for raising and pressing this objection.

26. For a similar argument, see Goldberg (2012). Of course, not all externalists think that demon victims lack justified perceptual beliefs. Bergmann (2006) doesn't and argues that this is an advantage for his proper functionalist externalism over against reliabilist externalisms.

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