

Jonathan Fuqua

Curriculum Vitae

fuqua0@purdue.edu ~ 217-440-8972

Education

Purdue University, Ph.D.	2018
University of Missouri-St. Louis, M.A. (Philosophy)	2009
Baylor University, M.A. (Church-State Studies)	2006
Culver-Stockton College, B.A. (History & Political Science)	2003

Areas of Specialization: Epistemology, Ethics, Philosophy of Religion

Areas of Competence: Medieval Philosophy, Early Modern Philosophy, Political Philosophy

Dissertation (Purdue): *Metaethical Mooreanism*

Committee: Michael Bergmann (chair), Patrick Kain, Matthias Steup, and Paul Draper

Master's Thesis (UMSL): *Warrant and the Value of Knowledge*

Committee: Berit Brogaard (chair), John Greco, and Eric Wiland

Publications

1. "Dogmatism Without Mooreanism," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 54:2 (2017): 169-181.
2. "Courting Epistemology: Legal Scholarship, the Courts, and the Rationality of Religious Belief," (co-authored with Shannon Holzer) *Oxford Journal of Law and Religion*, 3:2 (2014): 195-211.

Book Reviews

1. Review of *Free Will and Epistemology: A Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom*, by Robert Lockie, *Metapsychology Online Reviews* (forthcoming).
2. Review of *Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 9*, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau, *The Journal of Moral Philosophy* 15 (2018): 108-111.
3. Review of *Natural Signs and Knowledge of God: A New Look at Theistic Arguments*, by C. Stephen Evans, *Essays in Philosophy* 13 (2012): 611-616.

Papers under Review

- "Moore for (Almost) Everyone"
- "Why Religious Citizens Should Support Public Reason"

Works in Progress

- "Moore on the Argument from Empirical Moral Psychology"
- "Moore on Moral Disagreement"
- "Evolution, Disagreement, and Philosophy"
- "Moral Epistemological Disjunctivism"

Conference Presentations

1. "Evolution, Disagreement, and Philosophy," Helsinki Analytic Theology Workshop on Theological Epistemologies, University of Helsinki, February 2018.
2. "Moore for (Almost) Everyone," Northwestern/Notre Dame Graduate Epistemology Conference, University of Notre Dame, April 2017.
3. "Skeptical Theism and the Humean Argument from Evil," *SCP Pacific Regional Meeting*, University of San Diego, March 2016.
4. "A Holistic Response to the Problem of Evil," *Central Division APA Meeting*, March 2016.

5. "Skeptical Theism and the Humean Argument from Evil," *Western Michigan University Graduate Philosophy Conference*, December 2015.
6. "Skeptical Theism and the Humean Argument from Evil," *5th Annual HBU Philosophy Conference*, Houston Baptist University, September 2015.
7. "A Holistic Response to the Problem of Evil," *SCP Midwestern Regional Conference*, Spring Hill College, March 2015.
8. "Dogmatism Without Mooreanism," *Central Division APA Meeting*, February 2015.
9. "Dogmatism Without Mooreanism," Rochester Graduate Epistemology Conference, University of Rochester, October 2014.
10. "How to be a Scientific Anti-Realist," *Indiana Philosophical Association*, Indiana University-Purdue University, October 2014.
11. "Probability, Defeat, and Evil," *Fourth Annual HBU Philosophy Conference*, Houston Baptist University, April 2014.
12. "Warrant and the Epistemic Value Problem," Philosophy Graduate Conference, University of Windsor, March 2014.
13. "Disagreement, Realism, and Nihilism," *Indiana Philosophical Association*, Indiana University-Purdue University, October 2013.
14. "Why Religious Citizens Should Support Public Reason," The Henry Institute at Calvin College, April 2013.
15. "The Skeptical Theodist," *EPS Midwestern Regional Meeting*, Lincoln Christian University, March 2013. Winner of the Graduate Student Essay Contest.
16. "Desiring Theism," *Australasian Philosophy of Religion Association Conference*, University of Auckland, July 2011.
17. "How to Ground the Duty to Obey the Law," The Henry Institute at Calvin College, April 2011.
18. "Reformed Epistemology and Public Reason: A Plantingian Critique of Rawls's Doctrine of Public Reason," The Henry Institute at Calvin College, April 2006.

Conference Comments

1. Commented on Jonathan Dixon's "Re-tooling the Dream Argument," *Indiana Philosophical Association*, University of Indianapolis, November 2012.
2. Commented on Daniel Sportiello's "Fundamental Confusion," *Gateway Graduate Conference*, University of Missouri-St. Louis, March 2009.
3. Commented on Matthew Dasti's "Indian Theism and the Argument from Design," *Gateway Graduate Conference*, University of Missouri-St. Louis, April 2008.

Honors and Awards

- CEU Summer University, 2018 Summer Seminar in Moral Epistemology, Central European University (Budapest, Hungary), July 2018.
- Lumen Christi Institute, 2017 Graduate Seminar, "Is God Knowable by Natural Reason? Philosophy, Theology, and Trinitarian Thought in the Middle Ages," Pontifical University of the Holy Cross (Rome, Italy), June 2017; funded.
- St. Thomas Summer Seminar in Philosophy of Religion, University of St. Thomas (St. Paul, MN), June 2016; included a \$2,000 award.
- Witherspoon Institute, 2015 Thomistic Seminar: Aquinas and Contemporary Ethics (led by John Haldane), August 2015.
- Winner of the Graduate Student Essay Contest, *EPS Midwestern Regional Meeting*, Lincoln Christian University, March 2013.
- 1st place, M.A. category, Graham Writing Awards, Baylor University, May 2007. Awarded for a seminar paper entitled, "The Propriety of Religion in Political Discourse."

References

- Michael Bergmann
Professor of Philosophy, Purdue University
Beering Hall 7140
100 N University West St
West Lafayette, IN 47907
bergmann@purdue.edu
(765) 494-4584
- Patrick Kain
Associate Professor of Philosophy, Purdue University
Beering Hall 7138
100 N University West St
West Lafayette, IN 47907
kain@purdue.edu
(765) 494-4286
- Matthias Steup
Chair, Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado
169 Hellems Arts & Sciences Building
Hellems 274
University of Colorado
UCB 232
Boulder, CO 80309-0232
matthias.steup@colorado.edu
(303) 492-8449
- Paul Draper
Professor of Philosophy, Purdue University
Beering Hall 7130
100 N University West St
West Lafayette, IN 47907
pdraper@purdue.edu
(765) 496-9492

Teaching Experience: Attached

List of Graduate Courses Taken: Attached

Dissertation Abstract: Attached

Teaching Experience

Instructor (full responsibility for course):

Principles of Logic (Purdue University)
Introduction to Philosophy (Purdue University & Ivy Tech Community College)
Religions of the East (Purdue University)
Global Moral Issues (Purdue University)
Ethics (Purdue University & Ivy Tech Community College)
Philosophy of Religion (University of Missouri-St. Louis)
History of Philosophy (online course; University of Missouri-St. Louis)
Catholic Social Thought (Quincy University)

Teaching Assistant:

Philosophy of Religion (Purdue University)	Paul Draper
Biomedical Ethics (Purdue University)	Evan Williams
History and the Holocaust (Baylor University)	Marc Ellis

Graduate Courses Taken

Epistemology

Phenomenal Conservatism (Purdue)	Matthias Steup
Epistemology (Purdue)	Michael Bergmann & Matthias Steup
Moral Epistemology (Purdue)	Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain
Epistemology of Testimony (St. Louis U)	John Greco
Hume and Reid (St. Louis U)	John Greco

Philosophy of Religion

Problem of Evil (Purdue)	Paul Draper
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Metaphysics

Studies in Metaphysics (Purdue)	Michael Bergmann & Jeff Brower
Seminar in Metaphysics (UMSL)	Gualtiero Piccinini

Ethics and Political Philosophy

Kant's Ethics (Purdue)	Patrick Kain
Consequentialism (Purdue)	Evan Williams
Virtue Ethics (UMSL)	Eric Wiland
Seminar in Ethical Theory (UMSL)	Eric Wiland
Theories of Well-Being (UMSL)	Anna Alexandrova
Philosophy of Law (UMSL)	John Brunero
Medieval Political Thought (Baylor)	Thomas Hibbs
Contemporary Political Thought (Baylor)	David Cory
Liberation Theology (Baylor)	Marc Ellis

Logic, Language, and Philosophy of Science

Philosophy of Science (Purdue)	Martin Curd
Philosophy of Language (Purdue)	Rod Bertolet
Symbolic Logic (Purdue)	Ted Ulrich
Seminary in Philosophy of Science (UMSL)	Andrew Black
Graduate Formal Logic (UMSL)	Andrew Black

History of Philosophy ('†' indicates a course also listed above in subject area)

Descartes (Purdue)	Michael Jacovides
Kant's Ethics† (Purdue)	Patrick Kain
Hume and Reid† (St. Louis U)	John Greco
Plato (UMSL)	John McGinnis
Medieval Political Thought† (Baylor)	Thomas Hibbs

DISSERTATION ABSTRACT: METAETHICAL MOOREANISM

This dissertation is an attempt to apply the Moorean response to radical skepticism to moral skepticism. In a nutshell, I argue as follows. Assume that the following Moorean response to, say, BIV skepticism (the worry that I don't know I'm not a brain in a vat) is roughly correct: "I know I have hands, so I'm not a BIV; any argument to the contrary must have a flaw somewhere." If so, then such a Moorean should respond as follows to moral skepticism: "I know that recreational genocide is wrong, so it's false that there are no moral facts, and that I don't have any moral knowledge; any argument to the contrary must have a flaw somewhere."

In chapter 1, "Moore for Almost Everyone," I explicate the Moorean response to radical skepticism. I begin by outlining the main responses to skepticism currently on offer, and then move to a discussion of Mooreanism. I argue that Mooreanism is a metaphilosophical response to skepticism that essentially boils down to these two claims: (i) it is more rational for us to believe in the Moorean truths than it is to believe the conjunction of the skeptic's premises (a conjunction which entails the negation of a Moorean truth), and (ii) in virtue of (i) we can use our knowledge or justified belief in Moorean truths to provide a rational basis for rejecting skeptical premises. I proceed by discussing what it is to be a Moorean truth as well as how my conception of Mooreanism fits within the commonsense tradition.

Chapter 2, "Metaethical Mooreanism," extends Mooreanism to the metaethical dispute regarding whether we have moral knowledge. I first discuss Moorean truths in general and then argue that there are good reasons to include some moral truths in the domain of Moorean truths. After showing how this metaethical Mooreanism would apply to revisionary metaethical views, such as anti-realism and moral skepticism, I close by responding to Tristram McPherson's objection to the Moorean strategy, which boils down to the claim that there are evidential asymmetries between the two skeptical contexts which prevent the successful application of Mooreanism to the moral domain.

In chapter 3, "Moore on the Problem of Moral Disagreement," I apply metaethical Mooreanism to the problem of moral disagreement. I begin by giving a brief overview of the problem, after which I explain metaethical Mooreanism and show how the metaethical Moorean will look at the problem of moral disagreement. The basic idea is that the skeptic's argument from moral disagreement fails in the same way that arguments for radical skepticism fail, including skeptical arguments from disagreement: they are less rationally compelling than the Moorean truths they seek to overturn. No Moorean should stop with this metaphilosophical assessment, however; rather, Mooreans need to go on to diagnose which premise(s) in the skeptical arguments are false. My diagnosis challenges two of the skeptic's assumptions: (i) that we are in a position to say who our moral-epistemological peers are, and (ii) that there is significant disagreement on the metaethical question of whether there are moral facts.

In the final chapter, "Moore on the Argument from Empirical Moral Psychology," I apply metaethical Mooreanism to the alleged problem generated by empirical moral psychology. Roughly, the problem is that we seem to form many of our moral beliefs on the basis of our emotions, which are held to be epistemically suspect bases. After a discussion of the problem I show how the metaethical Moorean will look at the matter. The point the Moorean makes here is the same point the Moorean makes in defense of other Moorean truths: the Moorean truths have more going for them, epistemically, than do the skeptic's premises. The Moorean will not stop here but will go on to give a diagnosis of the problematic premise(s) in the skeptic's argument. I point to two sources of error in the argument from empirical moral psychology. The first is that affective states are non-rational or even irrational epistemic forces. Recent work in the philosophy of emotion calls this assumption into question. The second is the assumption that, if emotions are non-rational mental states, then they must be epistemically suspect; I argue that affective states can be epistemically reliable even if non-cognitive/non-conceptual.